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h i g h l i g h t s
• We analyze the R&D networks formed by either myopic or farsighted firms.
• Myopia leads to two minimally connected components of almost equal size.
• Farsightedness leads to two components of unequal size.
• The largest component comprises roughly three-quarters of firms.
• Farsightedness helps firms to better exploit the collaborative opportunities.
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a b s t r a c t
Weanalyze the formation of bilateral R&D collaborations in an oligopolywhen each firm benefits from the
research done by other firms it is connected to. In contrast to myopic stability, farsighted stability leads
to R&D networks consisting of two minimally connected components, with the largest one comprising
three-quarters of firms.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The objective of the paper is to analyze the R&D networks that
would arise in the long run with either myopic or farsighted firms.
We consider an n-firm industry, where initially identical firms pro-
duce a homogeneous good at a given marginal cost. Each firm is
able to reduce its marginal cost by forming a link with another
competitor. The cost reduction for one firm is proportional to the
number of firms it is connected to. When a new link is formed be-
tween two firms already linked with others, all connected firms
∗ Corresponding author at: CORE, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve,
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benefit in terms of cost reduction, but they are also adversely af-
fected in terms of market competition since they face stronger
competitors.1 The collection of all the bilateral links defines the
R&D network which in turn determines the marginal cost profile
for the n oligopolists. Once the R&D network is formed, firms com-
pete in quantities.
We find that firms add and delete links to form stable networks
consisting of two components each of them minimally connected.
1 In Mauleon et al. (2008), the reduction in marginal costs also depends on the
total number of connected firms, but themarginal effect of that reduction decreases
with the distance. In Goyal and Joshi (2003), the reduction in marginal costs only
depends on the number of direct links, as if each firm was able to isolate the
knowledge coming from each firm to which it is linked. In Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2001), firms even benefit, although imperfectly, from the research done
by firms to which they are not connected. All these papers study the emergence of
R&D networks among myopic firms.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.003
0165-1765/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
A. Mauleon et al. / Economics Letters 125 (2014) 340–342 341
The group of firms belonging to the largest component obtain a
competitive advantage upon the other group. The difference in the
number of firms between the two components is at most three
if firms are myopic. However, if firms are farsighted, R&D net-
works consisting of two minimally connected components, with
the largest one comprising roughly three-quarters of firms, become
stable. Therefore, when firms are farsighted, the larger group of
firms can derive from R&D collaborations a much greater compet-
itive advantage relative to the other group.
2. The model
We consider a two-stage game in a setting with n competing
firms that produce some homogeneous good. In the first stage,
firms decide the bilateral R&D collaborations. Let N = {1, 2, . . . ,
n} be the set of firms. A network g is a list ofwhich pairs of firms are
linked to each other and ij ∈ g indicates that i and j are linkedunder
g . The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing g is denoted
as g + ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from an
existing g is denoted as g − ij. Let N(g) = {i | there is j such that
ij ∈ g} be the set of firms that have at least one link in g . A path in g
between i and j is a sequence of firms i1, . . . , iK such that ikik+1 ∈ g
for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} with i1 = i and iK = j. A network g is
connected if for all i ∈ N(g) and j ∈ N(g)\{i}, there exists a path in
g connecting i and j. A nonempty subnetwork h ⊆ g is a component
of g , if for all i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(h) \ {i}, there exists a path in h
connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies
ij ∈ h. The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). A component
h of g is minimally connected if h has #N(h)−1 links. Knowing the
components of a network, we can partition the players into groups
within which players are connected. LetΠ(g) denote the partition
ofN induced by g . That is, S ∈ Π(g) if and only if either there exists
h ∈ C(g) such that S = N(h) or there exists i ∉ N(g) such that
S = {i}. We denote by S(i) the coalition S ∈ Π(g) such that i ∈ S.2
LetNki (g) = {j | t(ij) = k} be the set of firms that are connected
to firm i by a path of at least k links. Each firm benefits both from
its own R&D (reducing its marginal cost by 1) and from the R&D
done by the firms it is connected to (reducing its marginal cost by
j≠i δt(ij)−1). 3 Given a network g , the marginal cost for firm i is
given by
ci(g) = c0 − 1−
n−1
k=1
#Nki (g)δ
k−1
where c0 is a firm’s initial marginal cost and δ ∈ (0, 1]. We focus
on the case where each firm fully benefits from the research done
by the firms it is connected to: δ = 1.
In the second stage, firms compete in quantities in the
oligopolistic market, taking as given the costs of production. Let
p = a−i∈N qi with a > 0 be the linear inverse demand function.
Thus, firm i’s profits in g is given by Ui(g) = (qi(g))2 where the
equilibrium output is
qi(g) = 1n+ 1

a− c0 + (n+ 1)#S(i)−

S∈Π(g)
(#S)2

. (1)
In the first stage, network formation takes place.When firms are
myopic, given there are small but positive costs to forming links,
2 We use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion,  for strict inclusion, # for the
cardinality, and int(·) for the integer part.
3 Two distinct ways of modeling knowledge externalities in the context of an
oligopoly with cost-reducing R&D appear in the literature. Collaboration between
firms either increases the effective marginal cost reduction (output spillovers)
or increases the effective expenditure in research (input spillovers). Amir (2000)
shows that the two approaches are not equivalent from a quantitative and
qualitative point of view. The cost reduction approach appears to be of questionable
validity for large values of the spillover parameter.
we use a strict version of Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) notion of
pairwise stability as in Goyal and Joshi (2003). A network g is pair-
wise stable if (i) for all ij ∈ g ,Ui(g) > Ui(g− ij) andUj(g) > Uj(g−
ij), and (ii) for all ij ∉ g , ifUi(g) < Ui(g+ij), thenUj(g) ≥ Uj(g+ij).
The proof of the following proposition is available upon request.
Proposition 1. A network g is pairwise stable if and only if C(g) =
(h1, h2), h1 and h2 are minimally connected, N(h1)∪N(h2) = N, and
#N(h1) =

int((n+ 3)/2) if n even
(n+ 1)/2 if n odd.
3. Farsightedly stable R&D networks
We use a strict version of Herings, Mauleon and Vannetel-
bosch’s (2009) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set to de-
termine the networks that emerge when firms are farsighted. A
farsightedly improving path from g to g ′ ≠ g is a finite sequence
of graphs g1, . . . , gK with g1 = g and gK = g ′ such that for any k ∈
{1, . . . , K − 1} either (i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that Ui(gK )
≥ Ui(gk) or Uj(gK ) ≥ Uj(gk), or (ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such
that Ui(gK ) > Ui(gk) and Uj(gK ) > Uj(gk). If there exists a farsight-
edly improving path from g to g ′, thenwewrite g → g ′. For a given
g , let F(g) = {g ′ ∈ G | g → g ′}. This is the set of networks that
can be reached by a farsightedly improving path from g .
Definition 1. A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable if
(i) ∀ g ∈ G,
(ia) ∀ ij ∉ g such that g + ij ∉ G, ∃ g ′ ∈ F(g + ij) ∩ G such that
Ui(g ′) ≤ Ui(g) or Uj(g ′) ≤ Uj(g),
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g such that g − ij ∉ G, ∃ g ′, g ′′ ∈ F(g − ij)∩ G such that
Ui(g ′) ≤ Ui(g) and Uj(g ′′) ≤ Uj(g),
(ii) ∀g ′ ∉ G, F(g ′) ∩ G ≠ ∅.
(iii) @ G′  G such that G′ satisfies Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii).
Condition (ia) captures that adding a link ij to a network g ∈ G
that leads to a network outside G, is deterred by the threat of end-
ing in g ′. Here g ′ is such that there is a pairwise farsighted improv-
ing path from g + ij to g ′, and g ′ belongs to G, which makes g ′ a
credible threat. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then
for the case where a link is deleted. Condition (ii) requires external
stability. From any network outside of G there is a farsighted im-
proving path leading to some network in G. Condition (iii) is the
minimality condition. A pairwise farsightedly stable set of net-
works always exists.
We now show that the set of all networks g consisting of two
minimally connected components h1 and h2 such that #N(h1) =
int((3n+ 1)/4) and N(h1) ∪ N(h2) = N is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set of networks.
Proposition 2. The set G = {g | C(g) = (h1, h2), h1 and h2 are
minimally connected,#N(h1) = int((3n+1)/4) and N(h1)∪N(h2)
= N} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proof. Take anyg ∈ G. First, we show that condition (ia) is satis-
fied. The deviation fromg tog + ijwith i, j ∈ N(h1) or i, j ∈ N(h2)
is deterred since the cardinality of h1 or of h2 does not change
and forming links is costly. Moreover, fromg firms i ∈ N(h1) and
j ∈ N(h2) do not want to add the link ij to form a single component
of size n. Indeed, comparing Ui(g) = (a − c0 + (n + 1)(int((3n +
1)/4))− (int((3n+ 1)/4))2 − (n− int((3n+ 1)/4))2)2/(n+ 1)2
withUi(g+ ij) = (a−c0+n)2/(n+1)2, we have Ui(g) ≥ Ui(g+ ij)
for all n ≥ 3.
Second, we show that condition (ib) is satisfied. Since int((3n+
1)/4) > int((n+ 3)/2) if and only if n > 5, there is no profitable
deviation fromg tog−ij so that j is isolated ing−ij (i.e.Nj(g−ij) =
∅) for 3 ≤ n ≤ 5. For n > 5, the only profitable deviations from
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g tog − ij are such that j is isolated ing − ij (i.e. Nj(g − ij) = ∅).
We now show that such deviations are deterred because there is
a farsightedly improving path fromg − ij to some g ′ ∈ G and the
initial deviator, firm i, is worse off at g ′. Such a farsightedly im-
proving path fromg − ij looks as follows: first j adds a link jkwith
k ∈ h2 forming the component h2+ jk, next l ∈ h1− jk cuts her link
with i ∈ h1−jk so that l becomes isolated, next l adds a link lmwith
m ∈ h2+jk forming the component h2+jk+lm, and so forth. That is,
at each step, one firm belonging to the largest component ing be-
comes isolated and then this firm links to the smallest component
ing looking forward to the end network g ′ ∈ G where the small-
est component ing becomes now in g ′ the largest component with
size int((3n+1)/4). So, the end network g ′ ∈ F(g−ij)∩G, and firm
i that initially deleted the link ij is worse off in g ′ : Ui(g ′) < Ui(g)
(while j and firms in h2 prefer g ′ tog − ij).
Third, we show that condition (ii) is satisfied. Notice that we
only need to show that there is a farsightedly improving path from
any g consisting of minimally connected components to someg ∈G. Indeed, ifg ∈ F(g), theng ∈ F(g ′) for any g ′ ⊃ g withΠ(g ′) =
Π(g) because profits only depend on the cardinality of the compo-
nents and forming links is costly. We consider three cases. (a) Take
any g withΠ(g) = {N}. If there is ij ∈ g such that g − ij ∈G, then
g − ij ∈ F(g). Otherwise, we can build a farsightedly improving
path from g to someg ∈ G where first some firm i becomes iso-
lated, next another firm j becomes isolated, next i and j form the
link ij, next k becomes isolated, next k forms a link with either i or
j, and so forth until we reach someg ∈ G where firms that have
isolated other firms along the path are in the largest component.
(b) A similar farsightedly improving path can be built from any g
containing one component of cardinality between n and int((3n+
1)/4). From g (in case g has at least three components), at each
step, two firms belonging to the two smallest components form a
link until we reach a network g ′ consisting of only two components
(with one of them having cardinality larger than int((3n+ 1)/4)).
From g ′, we proceed as in (a) by first isolating a firm of the largest
component, next linking this firm with one firm of the smallest
component, and so forth until we reach a networkg ∈ G where
the firms that have linked the smallest components along the se-
quence are now in the component of cardinality n−int((3n+1)/4),
and the firms of the largest component in the initial network that
have isolated some firms are now in the component of cardinal-
ity int((3n + 1)/4) ing . (c) Consider now a network g contain-
ing only components of cardinality smaller than int((3n + 1)/4).
From g , at each step, two firms belonging to the two largest com-
ponents form a link until we reach a network g ′ with one compo-
nent of cardinality greater or equal than int((3n+ 1)/4) and some
smaller components. From g ′, we proceed as in (b) by first form-
ing links between the smallest components until reaching a net-
work g ′′ with two components, next isolating a firm of the largest
component and then linking this firm with one firm of the smaller
component, and so forth until we reach a networkg ∈G. Ing , the
firms that have linked the largest components along the sequence
as well as the firms that have isolated some firms from the largest
component once there were only two components in the network
are now in the component of cardinality int((3n + 1)/4), which
implies that they strictly prefer the end network to the network of
the sequence from which they moved. Notice that the firms that
have linked the smallest components once there was a component
of cardinality larger than int((3n+ 1)/4), are now better off in the
component of cardinality n− int((3n+ 1)/4).
Fourth, we show that condition (iii) is satisfied. Since g ∉ F(g ′)
for all g, g ′ ∈G, any proper subsetG  G violates condition (ii). 
Since there is no farsighted improving path between any two
networks in G, the set G is also a von Neumann–Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set.4 However, the set of all pairwise stable net-
works, denoted byG, is neither a pairwise farsightedly stable set
of networks nor a von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly sta-
ble set. Indeed,G violates the external stability condition (ii) since
g ∉ F(g ′) for all g ∈G and g ′ ∈G.5
Hence, we obtain that farsightedly stable R&D networks lead
to a collaboration architecture similar to the equilibrium structure
of Bloch’s (1995) sequential group formation game for forming re-
search associations where firms form two asymmetric alliances,
with the largest one comprising roughly three-quarters of indus-
try members.6 In fact, by assuming that all connected firms in a
network fully benefit from a new link, we recover Bloch’s (1995)
assumption that the benefits from cooperation increase linearly in
the size of the association. However, the network approach dif-
fers from the group formation approach by focusing on bilateral
relationships and allowing for a richer class of collaborations. It
also differs in the decision making for establishing R&D collabora-
tions. Mutual consent is needed for forming a new link between
two firms, whereas the consent of all members of the associa-
tion is usually required when a firm joins the association. Both ap-
proaches lead to similar conclusions only if firms are farsighted and
anticipate the reactions of other firms to the decisions they take.
Farsightedness helps firms to better exploit all the collaborative
opportunities they face.
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